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Law is a fiction,
2
 and copyright law is an excellent example for legal fictions. All its norms, 
definitions, doctrines – e.g. creativity, originality, personality, economic and moral rights, 
limitations and exceptions, to name a few – are created and regularly re-created by human minds to 
serve metaphorical purposes.
3
 At the same time, copyright law is not a limitless fiction. It has its 
historical development, roots, subjects, objects, purposes and limits. The ultimate question of 
copyright law is nothing else than why and to whom do laws assign copyright protection?
4
 And the 
short answer to these questions is simple enough: expressions of the human mind shall be protected 
for the benefit of individual creators on the one hand and mankind in general on the other hand. 
This shall serve as a starting point and a guiding light when assessing the impacts and guessing the 
future of copyright protection of outputs/contents generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
 
The symbiosis of copyright protection and technological innovation dates back to centuries and has 
been closely connected ever since the modern movable type-based printing press was invented by 
Johannes Gutenberg. In most cases, both society and the rights holders have profited from this 
symbiotic interconnection, as the new technologies were created for the sake of humanity and 
rights holders became entitled for compensation. On the other hand, Jessica Litman pointed out 
that “[c]opyright laws become obsolete when technology renders the assumptions on which they 
were based outmoded”.
5
 New (disruptive) technologies have made copyright law fragile. This 
fragility was further exaggerated by the delayed (and occasionally ineffective) legislative reactions. 
Likewise, users have always been more willing to take advantage of innovations rather than strictly 
following the provisions of copyright law (and paying royalty to the authors). Unsurprisingly, 
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copyright laws and rights holders usually tried to eliminate or, alternatively, to control new 
technologies. The clash between the rights holders’ and the society’s interests speeded up by the 




Policy reports and scholarly papers on the protectability of computer generated contents were 
published as early as 1965.
7
 While the intersection between AI and copyright law has been 
continuously discussed since then, it has become an extremely hot topic recently.
8
 Both the 
number and the depth of research on legal aspects of AI show an extreme growth. Many of these 










 or the role of AI in comparative research
14
 – can have direct relevance for copyright 
law. The legal discussion of AI dominates a significant part of the copyright discourse and 
academic events these years. 
 
While a significant amount of (let’s call them AI-positivist) papers accept the idea of the 
protectability of AI-generated outputs,
15
 this paper follows a rather AI-pessimistic approach. 
Daniel Gervais questioned whether IP law is ready for AI.
16
 I believe that copyright law is neither 
ready for a paradigm shift, nor is it appropriate to protect AI-generated outputs. Carys Craig and 
Ian Kerr noted that any conclusion that copyright law’s existing fictions shall be stretched to cover 
AI is “nonsense upon stilts”.
17
 This paper agrees with this opinion and argues that copyright’s old 
author-centric paradigm shall be retained.
18
 The key arguments will be closely connected to one 
single notion of copyright law, namely the author itself. The paper takes the view that the most 
fundamental (or core) elements of copyright law are deeply connected to human authorship. 
Indeed, as long as there is no convincing policy argument or legal and economic evidence to the 
contrary, the status quo of copyright law shall not be stretched to cover algorithmic creativity as 
well. 
 
The structures of this paper is as follows. Chapter II focuses on the most important features of AI 
from a copyright perspective. This part is strictly target-oriented. Instead of conclusively defining 
AI from a scientific perspective (that this author is unable to do) I’ll only filter out the key elements 
of algorithmic creativity, and discuss why is it imaginable at all that AI-generated outputs might be 
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protected by copyright law. Chapter III provides a collection of notable examples for algorithmic 
creativity – ranging from music to movies, software, literature and fine art. This part is neither in 
favour nor against the protectability of AI-outputs. It only highlights that the “AI creative industry” 
certainly exists. Chapter IV raises four further (open) questions, and ultimately guesses whether 
copyright law is the right tool to protect AI-outputs. Chapter V answers the most important 
question of Chapter IV, and includes the AI-pessimistic approach of this author. It discusses five 
distinct, still closely interconnected issues/concepts of copyright law; namely, its history, its 
justifications, the concept of author, originality and moral rights. I believe that these fundamental 
pillars or core elements of copyright law speak against any protection of AI-outputs, and there is no 
conclusive evidence that would necessitate the overruling of the status quo. Chapter VI lists 
multiple ideas that other (both AI-optimistic and AI-pessimistic) authors raised as possible options 
to protect AI-generated outputs by (some form of) copyright law. This paper takes the view that the 
majority of these solutions are either unconvincing or ineffective. A very limited number of options 
might be acceptable theoretically, but testing them in reality (that is, providing some form of IP 
protection to AI-outputs) deserves careful ex ante analysis. Such analysis, especially economic 
modelling of the effects of AI-copyright on the original copyright industry and the “newcomers”, is 
practically missing yet. In the final chapter, the paper concludes that the time has not come (yet) to 
fit emergent works into copyright law. 
 
II. What is Artificial Intelligence? 
 
Dreams of thinking machines, algorithms, artificial intelligence – tools that are first imagined by 
Ada Lovelace and Charles Babbage,
19
 and then put into reality by computer scientists like Claude 
Shannon and Alan Turing – came true.
20
 What AI really means (or should mean) is, however, a 
mystery – obscured by thick clouds. As Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid noted, “defining AI is not an easy 
task”.
21
 This can easily be noticed in light of the recurring attempts to define AI that share common 
doctrinal elements (similarities) and show significant differences as well. 
 
Pamela Samuelson called AI “a specialty field within computer science that is aimed at producing 
computers that exhibit intelligent conduct”.
22
 Amit Konar viewed AI as the “simulation of human 
intelligence on a machine, so as to make the machine efficient to identify and use the right piece of 
‘Knowledge’ at a given step of solving a problem”.
23
 Nils J. Nilsson opined that “AI is that activity 
devoted to making machines intelligent, and intelligence is that quality that enables an entity to 
function appropriately and with foresight in its environment”.
24
 The European Commission 
defined AI as “systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and 
taking actions – with some degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals”.
25
 According to 
Florian De Rouck “AI systems will be designed to perform human-like cognitive tasks, steadily 
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improving their performance by learning from experience or external data”.
26
 Finally, Mauritz 
Kop, citing Stephen Hawking, argued that AI is “a non-human system that possesses cognitive 
functions and skills such as learning and reasoning. A smart computer that can think and plan 





AI can be either a software or a hardware;
28
 and it can be a system, an entity and a science as 
well.
29
 More importantly, depending upon the independence and the “creativity” of the given 
software or hardware, we can differentiate between strong (full), general or weak (narrow) AI.
30
 
This latter category is what matters the most from the perspective of copyright law. From mere 
tools or assistants to human activities, algorithms, robots or machines have become “creators” (or 




The creation of/with AI has three main stages: (1) coding; (2) input, training or machine learning; 
and (3) output.
32
 Coding is mainly a human privilege (yet), and input/training is also heavily 
overseen by humans in the majority of cases. Various algorithms (most importantly Artificial 
Neural Networks or strong AI) are coded in a way that they are capable of learning autonomously, 
that is, to select the input they are willing to analyse. Indeed, “machine learning algorithms can 
rewrite themselves”.
33
 In sum, a significant amount of output might be generated by the machine 
with no causal connection between the original human programmer and the final output – usually 




The real challenges to copyright protectability might come from this part of AI. As long as a 
machine or algorithm is only a mere tool or assistant to a human creator, copyright law is more or 
less ready to classify the final output as a protectable subject matter. Challenges arise as soon as the 





III. AI in the creative industries 
 
AI is a part of our daily life.
36
 Many of us use automatic word processing and translation services, 
commute with GPS-navigation offering real-time traffic data (based on the geolocation function of 
our cell phones), use chatbots to file our complaints or request information from various 
corporation, or discuss any questions with virtual assistants like Siri. AI is used in sports, health 
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care, weapon industry, robotics, virtual reality, fintech, retail stores, digital marketing, fashion 
industry, and it is the holy grail of self-driving cars.
37
 Museums and other members of the “art 
industry” also use AI as a part of their services; e.g. humanoid/anthropomorphic robots to learn the 
reactions of visitors,
38
 provide help to the visitors,
39
 apps based on image recognition technology 
to support museumgoers to identify artworks,
40
 or to measure the value/price of an artwork.
41
 
Robot AI might be able to foresee global epidemic,
42
 and hence support the fight against 
humanitarian catastrophes.
43
 Big data would also remain an uncontrollable ocean of information 
without algorithms.  
 
AI has an exponentially growing relevance in the copyright industry as well. AI is both a topic of 
creative contents (object) and the generator of such contents (subject). A vast amount of motion 
pictures focus on the life, feelings, love and fate of AI in an anthropocentric world;
44
 the way how 
artificial creations (machines, algorithms or even Replicants) confront with humans;
45
 and how 
machines might create art.
46
 In the movie industry, AI might be effectively used for marketing 
purposes, e.g. for selecting the best possible date of cinema releases.
47
 It won’t take too much time 













evidence machines’ ability to generate new musical contents.
53
 Algorithms are ready to finish 
symphonies,
54
 to compete on a “Eurovision” contest dedicated to algorithms,
55
 or to generate 
parodies of existing works.
56
 Indeed, they are capable to translate the spike protein (the structure) 
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of SARS-CoV-2 into classic music (that researchers believe to help understanding the functioning 




AI scored significant victories in the domain of art. The Next Rembrandt project gained a lot of 
publicity,
58
 as well as the sale of the AI-generated Portrait of Edmond Bellamy by the auction 
house Christie’s for 432,500 USD.
59
 Although it is not “classic art”, but e-David generates 
portraits with its “artificial brushes”,
60
 and the futuristic dream images of DeepDream
61
 look 




AI – or simply robots – has long been the object of classic science-fiction literature,
63
 but it has 









 show the capacity of AI to generate 
literary works, from haikus to novels.
68
 Some outputs are as entertaining (and some are as boring) 
as human works. Artificial poets and novelists might need to be ready to e-dedicate their works for 
their human readers, if this trend continues. 
 
AI also became more than a tool in the news industry. RADAR, with significant human 
intervention, creates automated news reports;
69
 Automated Insights’ and Narrative Science’s 
algorithm reports about sports events;
70
 Quakebot, developed by the Los Angeles Times, reports 
on earthquakes in California.
71
 The protection of such AI might become a reality soon. In China, 
for example, a court ruled in early 2020 that Tencent has valid copyright claim over the articles 
produced by the corporation’s Dreamwriter algorithm.
72
 As the Court argued, direct connection 
(or causal link, as I argued above) existed between the editorial team’s creative choices and the 
final output of the algorithm. The selection, judgment and skills of the editorial team’s members 
and the above-the-minimum level of creativity of the outputs ultimately allow for the protection of 




IV. Open Questions of the Future of AI and Copyright 
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Before turning to my arguments against the introduction of any norms on AI-copyright, we shall 
address a few open questions of this field. 
 
First, do we face any “AI winter” yet? AI-science has chilled at least twice since research on this 
field started many decades ago.
74
 In light of the continuous development of Artificial Neural 
Networks, the enormous amounts of funding involved,
75
 as well as the fact that AI has become a 
part of our daily routine,
76
 we might tend to believe that no significant AI winter is ahead of us 
anymore. Critical voices exist, though. Some have noted that the hysteria around AI “could 
actually end up turning people against AI research, bringing significant progress in the technology 
to a halt”.
77
 Or as a columnist wrote: “[t]oday’s ‘AI summer’ is different from previous ones. It is 
brighter and warmer, because the technology has been so widely deployed. Another full-blown 




Second, will future AI algorithms need any human intervention at all? This question might look 
naïve as we already have strong AI that generates outputs without human contribution. We need to 
stress, however, that coding of AI (the first step of the AI-process) is still dominantly a human 
domain. Furthermore, not all AI can generate outputs autonomously. The success of algorithms 
depends heavily on human participation in the creation process yet. The best example here might 
be The Next Rembrandt project. There, programmers taught the algorithm and selected the features 
of the new “painting” as well. The ultimate creation of the output was done by the AI itself, but 
strictly bound to programmers’ decisions. The same is true for RADAR, as introduced above. In 
short, human participation in the “AI industry” remains necessary for a period of time. This also 
means that challenging copyright’s status quo is not an urgent task yet. 
 
Third, will there be any market/need for AI-generated contents? At first sight, this question might 
be outdated, since the sale of the Portrait of Edmond Bellamy evidences that there is at least some 
market for some emergent works. Still, we shall remain cautious with generalizing the relevance of 
the Christie’s auction. On the one hand, the sale of AI artworks by auction houses is still the 
exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, the mere sale of any output does not necessitate 
any legislation on this field. In the lack of empirical evidence, we are unable to measure whether 
AI-generated outputs could replace human creations on the market or not.
79
 It is similarly far from 
certain that the successful sale of the Portrait of Edmond Bellamy could be repeated in other fields 
of the creative industry. While art is quite subjective, the biological differences of the inception of 
various artworks are significant. Harmony and logic has for example more relevance in the field of 
music or literature. Random words bear no meaning, but random brush strokes might be visual art. 
Finally, “market” is neither only about the quality of the given content, it is also about branding. 
While AI-generated music is a reality, there is no guarantee that humans would find AI-music more 
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appealing and would purchase more tickets to a Compressorhead
80
 concert than to a Motörhead 
event. (We have no evidence to the contrary either.) We lack empirical and economic evidence 
regarding the marketability of AI-outputs, which is a great concern from a policy perspective. 
 
Fourth, is there any real need to protect AI-generated outputs by copyright law? In her study on the 
“European Civil Law Rules in Robotics”, Nathalie Nevejans took the view that “[t]here is no need 
to overhaul the whole body of literary and artistic property law, but merely to adjust it in the light of 
the autonomous robots´ new/future abilities”.
81
 I am not confident that this is a correct opinion. 
Copyright law is a complex net of various concepts, doctrines, theories and rules. Stretching this 
net to fit AI into copyright law does neither look an easy task nor a wise decision. Some elements of 
copyright law can easily be applied in an AI environment, even in the lack of any paradigm shift. 
For example, software programmers, who develop an algorithm and contribute to the causal link 
between the input and the output, might fit into the concept of author.
82
 Similarly, the existing 
rules on the copyright and sui generis protection of database authors and database 




Emergent works trigger more uncertainties. What legislative justifications can serve as a basis for 
the protection of emergent works? What about exclusivity of rights or monopolies? Shall we grant 
exclusive rights to those algorithms that might flood the market with an unlimited amount of 
outputs? Shall we grant personality and moral rights to AI? Who shall have the ownership interests 
over the AI-generated outputs? Shall we find a human behind the machine? Shall we analogically 
apply the work-made-for-hire doctrine in the AI environment? What about originality? Can AI be 
intellectual, creative and expressive? How to count the term of protection, if algorithms do not age? 
Shall autonomous machine learning comply with the existing limitations and exceptions of 
economic rights? Shall we use the rules on technological protection measures and rights 
management information to AI outputs as well? Without the lack of any personality on AI’s side, 
who shall bear the liability or accountability for any possible infringement of others’ copyrights 
(during the coding, learning and output phases)? Who and how can enforce any possible rights in 
favour of AI? Who shall enjoy the benefits (harvest the fruits) and receive any rewards for the 
misuse of any AI-generated output? Will AI have any standing to defend itself or sue others? And 
this list might easily include further dozens of similar questions. 
 
In short, copyright law is far more complex than allowing a mere “adjustment” to fit AI into its 
domain. Indeed, relying on the sports language of American football: the ruling on the field might 
only be reversed if there is any indisputable (conclusive) evidence for the reversal. More clearly: 
the status quo of copyright law might only be overruled or stretched if there is significant and 
balanced evidence that AI deserves an equivalent level of protection with humans. Otherwise we 
might run into a serious trap. As Jan Zibner noted, “[t]o regulate an uncertain phenomenon with no 




V. The ruling on the field… 
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I often use the metaphor of an ancient Greek temple to describe copyright law in general. An 
ancient Greek temple has three main parts: the foundations and crepidoma; the columns; and the 
entablature (including the most decorated, top triangle-shaped tympanon).
85
 In a pure metaphoric 
sense, the foundations and crepidoma of the temple of copyright is its history and the incentives 
that the system is based on. The columns of the temple are the doctrinal elements of the existence of 
copyright law, e.g. the author and related rights holders; originality (threshold of protection); 
subject matter; economic and moral rights; limitations and exceptions; term of protection. The 
entablature of the temple of copyright are the tools, methods and practices how copyrights are 
exercised and enforced. Five elements of this metaphoric temple require careful analysis in order to 
decide, whether AI-generated outputs can fit into the concept of copyright law. These are the 
history of copyright, copyright incentives, the concept of authorship, originality, and moral rights. I 
believe that these core elements of the regime run against the inclusion of emergent works in 
copyright law. As long as AI-outputs do not fit into or fulfil the requirements of these “core 
elements”, we cannot talk about AI-copyright at all. 
 
1. Copyright’s short history 
 
The emergence of copyright protection is due to the appearance and conjunction of four different 
factors. First, the (European) invention of the printing press replaced manual multiplication with 
massive reproduction of written works (mainly books), and made the copies marketable. We might 
call this factor the “material side” of copyright’s history. Second, individualism and the 
Renaissance increased the interest of self-expression as well as the protection of the 
personal/intellectual interests of authors. We might call this factor the “personal side” of 
copyright’s history. Third, with the advent of public education as well as the Renaissance’s artistic 
explosion, citizens’ demand to become owners of physical copies of intellectual creations 
culminated in a new copyright ecosystem. We might call this factor the “market/consumption side” 
of copyright’s history. Fourth, for various centuries (from the 15
th
 to the 18
th
 century), kings or 
other leaders of European countries/cities granted “patents” to specific printers to exclusively print 
specific or all books at a designated geographical territory.
86
 It took centuries to learn that these 
monopolies do not serve the society in general. It was only in 1709 that the English political 
environment became ready to settle and regulate the copyright ecosystem.
87
 We might call this 




A look at the first ever copyright acts of the world might evidence the basic rationale of copyright 
law. In England, before the Statute of Anne came into force on April 10
th
, 1710, the Stationers 
Company controlled book publishing.
89
 The Company’s monopoly was based on its role as a 
censor on behalf of the Crown.
90
 The interests of the authors were rarely articulated. The authors 
could sell their “copy rights” to the printers for a one-time fee, but they did not receive a share from 
                                                          
85
 Cautious readers might notice that the structure of an Ancient Greek temple is much more sophisticated, partially 
depending upon the relevant order (Ionic, Doric or Corinthian), than the short generalization I used above. On Ancient 
Greek architecture see in details: Barletta (2001). 
86
 See e.g. Matthews (1890) 587-589.; Ginsburg (2016) 237-267. 
87
 Compare to Rose (2010) 67-88. 
88
 Mezei (2014) 73-75. 
89
 Compare to e.g. Gadd (2016) 81-95. 
90
 Matthews (1890) 589-590. 
the income that the Company generated from the publications. The Company and its censorship 
turned to be a limitation to a prospering publishing market and national literature in the 17
th
 century. 
John Milton (in his Areopagitica) and later Daniel Defoe argued in favor of the elimination of 
censorship and the introduction of freedom of press, as well as the legislative protection of authors. 
The Statute of Anne finally eliminated the Company’s monopolies, declared that the rights of 
reproduction and distribution should be vested in the authors for a limited (but renewable) period of 
time, and introduced the doctrine of public domain.
91
 Based on the IP Clause of the Constitution,
92
 
the first Copyright Statute of the United States, introduced in 1793, intended to “promote the 
progress of science and useful arts”. The law thus aimed to reach a balance between the interests of 
the creators and the society as a whole. The basic objective of the first French Copyright Statute 
(the so called “Chénier Act”), similarly created in 1793, during the bloody years of the French 
Revolution, was to introduce liability for the content of the citizens’ speech.
93
 Irrespective of the 
different economical, technological, intellectual, social and political challenges that these countries 




 century, these first copyright acts were common in the protection of 
individual human authors on the one hand, and in serving the interests of the general public on the 
other hand. 
 
The history of copyright law undeniably proves that the development of technology has instigated 
the most legal changes. At the same time, as Rochelle C. Dreyfuss correctly noted, IP law has also 
enabled the various industrial revolutions: “[t]raditional forms of intellectual property rights 
(patents, copyrights, and trademarks) created strong incentives to expend time, effort, and money 




Yoshiyuki Tamura depicts the joint evolution of technology and copyright law with three “waves”. 
The first wave was the European invention of the printing press. In Tamura’s opinion the second 
wave came in the second half of the 20
th
 century with the appearance of analogue reproduction 
technologies, when a larger portion of the society became able to copy protected materials at home. 
Digital technologies and the internet brought the third wave, as they allow for easy, fast and cheap 
access to and use of protected subject matter in the digital domain.
95
 Irrespective of Tamura’s 
selective conception (it merely disregarded technologies that were related to the appearance of 
audio and audiovisual contents, e.g. photographs, camera, motion pictures, radio, sound recordings 
etc.), his theory correctly points out that most of the challenges and changes to the copyright 
system were induced by the newly invented technologies in the last three centuries. At the same 
time, the technological development has always correlated with the consumers’ needs, as well as 




In sum, irrespective of the effects of various technological achievements on law and society as well 
as the emergence of corporate interests, and ultimately the dominance of trade related aspects of 
intellectual property over the romantic concept of authorship, copyright’s history evidences that 
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the ultimate goal of copyright law has always been to serve individual authors’ human-centric and 
the human society’s general commercial and cultural purposes – in short: the cultural and economic 
development of humankind. As we have seen above, AI is such a broad concept (hardware, 
software and science at the same time) that it can serve the human society’s goals in a broad sense. 
Just recall the AI-led research in the fight – and hoped triumph over – global epidemics that 
seriously hamper economic, social and cultural development. Nevertheless, AI’s general 
advantages do not mean that algorithms shall be treated on an equal level with humans’ individual 
or collective interests. Copyright history is unquestionably a human history. Indeed, as subject 
matter has been historically connected to human authorship under the Berne Convention, emergent 
works would not enjoy the multinational protection of the Convention at all, even if their countries 




2. Copyright Incentives 
 
A myriad of researchers discusses the justifications of copyright protection. Only to name a few, 
William Fisher, in his widely cited paper spoke about welfare, fairness, culture and social planning 
theories.
98
 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid mentioned law and economics, personality, labour theories.
99
 
Takashi Yamamoto differentiated between labour, personality, incentive and vehicle theories.
100
 





This paper is unable and unwilling to judge which opinion is the most convincing. I therefore use 
the most well-known expressions, and I’ll differentiate between three main forms of justifications 
of copyright law: the personality, the labour and the utilitarian theories. It is worth noting that no 
copyright regimes are based on any single justifications like these; indeed, all countries rely on a 
mixture of various theories.
102
 Even the most utilitarian copyright regimes respect the personality 
of authors;
103
 and, vice versa, “it’s all about the money” in the most author-centric regimes as well. 
 
What matters more, for the purposes of this paper, is that both the personality and the labour theory 
are strictly connected to an individual creator’s personal achievements. While the labour theory 
focuses more on the invested energy and hard work of that person, and the personality theory 
focuses more on the intellectual/metaphysical bond between the author and “her child”, both 
justifications admit that protection is granted to the human author for the creation of the intellectual 
output. 
 
                                                          
97
 Ginsburg (2018) 134-135. 
98
 Fisher (2001) 168-199. 
99
 Yanisky-Ravid (2017) 699-707.  
100
 Yamamoto (2018) 4-8. 
101
 Craig / Kerr (2019) 32-33. For further discussions related to incentives and artificial intelligence see e.g. Bently / 
Sherman (2009) 34-39.; Ramalho (2017) 18-20.; Rohner (2019) 70-74.; Dornis (2019) 1257-1258. 
102
 Ginsburg (1990) 991-1031.; Ricketson (1991) 4-8. 
103
 “Utilitarianism, in short, does not escape the ideological clutches of the romantic author-function. Moreover, the 
individualized, atomistic self of liberal theory that supports and overlays the romantic author figure is positively 
vibrant in utilitarian theory.” See Craig / Kerr (2019) 35. Or as Monroe Price and Malla Pollack put it, “the intention 
central here is the intention to profit from the system – not the intention to create masterpieces”. See Price / Pollack 
(1992) 713. 
The labour and the utilitarian concepts share another common point: copyright protection is 
granted to reward the intellectual (occasionally physical) investment in the creation and to 
incentivise any future creations. Under these concepts, the author (be it a human or a “deemed 
author”, e.g. a corporation) shall enjoy the fruits of her work. 
 
Irrespective of the justification(s) that a given country applies in its copyright regime, all theories 
are inherently bound to the concept of author. In an AI-environment, the personality right 
justification shall be declined per se, as long as algorithms do not have any e-personality (which is 
not the case yet). The labour and the utilitarian concepts might look applicable to a certain level to 
emergent works, as these theories focus on the reward and the incentives of creation rather than on 
the creator itself. Algorithms, however, rarely have any interests in rewards and incentives. Daniel 
Gervais noted perfectly that “if an AI machine is programmed to ‘create’, it requires no ex ante 
legal incentive or ex post reward for doing so”.
104
 No doubt, several policy considerations might 
argue for the introduction of AI-copyright. Kalin Hristov noted that the copyright status quo might 
chill innovation in general or the developers to create, use and improve the AI machines’ 
capabilities, as well as limit the number of available works for teaching, research or other 
purposes.
105
 Similarly, Robert C. Denicola was on the view that “a work’s contribution to the 
public welfare does not seem dependent on the process that produced it”, hence it seems to be 




It seems so that the existing copyright status quo might only be amended or extended to emergent 
works, if there is any new, convincing justification to cover AI-generated outputs. At the moment, 
we are not aware of proper evidence on the detrimental effects of the lack of AI-protection. In sum, 
there are more convincing arguments against than in favour of the protection of emergent works 




3. The concept of authorship 
 
Copyright statutes, as well as international copyright treaties fail to define one of the most 
important elements of the regime, namely the concept of “author”. Commentators of the Berne 
Convention confirm that the lack of the definition is generally due to the common understanding 
among the Member States that authors are those humans, who create the original works of 
expression.
108
 Even in the silence on authorship, the Berne Convention necessitates to the same 
conclusion by requiring that authors are nationals of the Member States of the Union, as nationality 
can only be granted to human individuals.
109
 The same result can be reached through a 
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fundamental/human rights approach. Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Right
110
 grant human rights to 
“everyone” – where “everyone” practically means “humans”.
111
 This logic is further supported by 
case law. The CJEU concluded in various cases that originality (and therefore copyright protection) 
requires that authors shall put their personal touch on their intellectual creations.
112
 Since the 
seminal Trade-mark Cases,
113
 US courts often use the expression “creation of the mind” in this 
context – and there they refer to human minds.
114
 In sum, domestic copyright regimes are 
generally based on the “originalist premise” of authorship. 
 
Copyright acts, however, protect others than humans as well. The European Union’s Software 
Directive – through a legal fiction – expressly allowed for the Member States to grant authorship 
status to legal persons.
115
 Another example for “deemed authorship” comes from the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine. According to it, an employer (or commissioner), including legal 
persons, might automatically be treated as the author of the work that originates from the employee 
(commissioned person), or it might contractually acquire the copyrights related to the given work. 
The classic European related rights break the anthropocentric system of copyright law by granting 
separate rights to producers of films, sound recordings and other corporations, e.g. broadcasting 
organizations; and by allowing for transfer of copyrights of authors and performers to the related 
rights holders at the same time. Strong policy arguments favoured such “breaks” of the 
author-centric copyright. Those policy arguments include(d) the fights against piracy, supporting 
investment and innovation. To the contrary, such a “break” is correctly refuted, where no strong 
policy arguments support the protection of non-human originators. Such a notable example is the 
lack of protection for the benefit or animals. This is best evidenced by the famous (or notorious) 
Monkey selfie case. There a US federal court refused to grant protection to photographs made by a 
black macaque.
116
 Several scholars base their policy considerations on this case to argue in favour 
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117
 This view is, however, superficial and totally misleading at the same 
time. Animals might execute cognitive tasks that might serve “communication purposes”; they 
however, never do such acts for “dissemination purposes”. Animals do not aim to be treated as 
authors, do not fight for individual rights nor do they create for rewards and incentives. If we use 
the Naruto case as an analogy, it might be a better analogy against AI-copyright rather than in 
favour of it. 
 
Shall AI be treated as a subject of authorship?
118
 Should we grant such status to algorithms even in 
the clear lack of any personality on their side?
119
 And finally, even if we grant e-personality to 
machines, shall that concept be an equivalent of the personality rights granted to humans? 
 
I take the view that only humans can be authors in a copyright sense.
120
 As Christopher 
Buccafusco perfectly summarized: “[c]onstitutionally, copyright law requires authors; it cannot 
simply kill them off”.
121
 Or as Guido Noto La Diega noted, “[t]he fully dehumanised production of 
authorial and entrepreneurial works requires either interpretative stretches or, better, a legislative 
reform that clarifies the crucial points of authorship and ownership of AI works”.
122
 For the 
purposes of copyright protection there must be a human behind the machine, and authorship cannot 
be fully “de-romanticized”;
123
 or, as Josefien Vanherpe put it: “[c]reativity is hereby viewed as a 
quintessentially human faculty”.
124
 And vice versa, the generation of any output is outside of the 
scope of copyright law, if there is no causal link between the output and any human behind the 
production of that output. If legislation intends to assign some form of IP protection to 
AI-generated outputs, that protection shall not be based on any “algorithmic authorship”. These 
two words represent an irresolvable paradox. 
 
4. The threshold of originality 
 
Similarly to the concept of author, originality is not defined by international copyright norms. 
Nothing else than an open list of possible subject matters and a mere reference to “original works” 
in the Berne Convention,
125
 and the coverage of idea v. expression dichotomy by various 
treaties
126
 help countries to set the threshold of protection in their domestic copyright regimes. 
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For long, the domestic variations of originality showed significant differences,
127
 ranging from the 
“sweat of the brow” doctrine in the USA
128
 through the British “skill, labour and judgment”
129
 or 
the Canadian “exercise of skill and judgment”
130
 to the Continental European quest for “personal 
imprints” of the authors
131
 and the (strictest) German “Schöpfungshöhe” (level of creativity).
132
 In 
the last three decades, however, we have witnessed a global merger of the concept of originality.
133
 
This “global entropy” is partially due to various concurring events/rulings in different 
countries/regions of the world. E.g. the United Kingdom accessed the European Economic 
Community (later the European Union) in 1973, and the EU directives have led to doctrinal 
changes to the topic of originality in the UK.
134
 The United States joined the Berne Convention in 
1988 (as well as other multilateral treaties in the 1990s); and the Supreme Court of the United 
States quashed the “sweat of the brow” doctrine in its seminal Feist v. Rural ruling in 1991.
135
 In 
fact, the USA got closer to its European counterparts regarding the meaning of originality.
136
 The 
CJEU introduced a “common denominator” concept of the threshold of originality. This 
autonomous concept of EU law turned to be stricter than the British concept of “skill, labour and 




It is also important that originality is closely connected to various other concepts of copyright law, 
and hence it cannot be discussed in an isolated way. All intentions to apply originality to emergent 




 and – in 
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David Cropley’s recent book on human creativity started with a simple statement: “[n]obody really 
knows what creativity is!”
141
 Unsurprisingly, AI-positivist researchers pay close attention to the 
concept of creativity to convince their readers that AI-generated outputs fulfil the requirements of 
originality. As Florian De Rouck put it, “[w]hether a computer can be creative is ultimately a 
philosophical question”.
142
 Similarly, Tim W. Dornis argued that creativity might be viewed from 
the perspective of the process or the result; where “process creativity” focuses on the originator’s 
creative choices, and “result creativity” focuses on the output’s features.
143
 This second category 
might be the means to protect emergent works. 
 
This logic is, however, flawed for at least a few reasons. First, as indicated above, creativity is not 
a prerequisite of protection in many countries, including the European Union. To the contrary, 
originality is generally fixed to authorship and subject matter, both of which are closely connected 
to humans and human achievements. Second, originality’s “original premise” is much more 
personal and cultural than any utilitarian understanding, e.g. Dornis’ “process creativity”, would 
suggest. Indeed, as Neil Weinstock Netanel convincingly noted, copyright’s “production function” 
is to provide “an incentive for creative expression on a wide array of political, social, and aesthetic 




The romantic concept of authorship (and the quest for geniuses in the process of creation) might be 
dead – but human-centric authorship is still alive. As Sam Ricketson put it: “[t]here [should] be 
some intellectual contribution above and beyond that of simple effort (‘sweat of the brow’)” for the 
purposes of copyright protection.
145
 Copyright law is not an investment protection scheme.
146
 The 
fact that some countries have entered a sharp “AI race” recently,
147
 does not legitimize the need for 
(urgent) protection of emergent works.
148
 Originality cannot be dehumanized, and cannot be 
lowered to cover non-human, algorithmic (mass) production of outputs as well – at least not 
without any good reason. 
 
5. Moral rights versus AI 
 
Finally, moral rights deserve close attention by both AI-pessimists and positivists. The main 
purpose of moral rights – e.g. the most well-known examples: the rights of paternity, integrity, first 
publication and withdrawal – is to build a strong personal relationship between the author and her 
work.
149
 In a truly metaphoric sense, moral rights intend to protect the author’s “trademarks” in the 
copyright industry.  
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Anne Lauber-Rönsberg and Sven Hetmank noted that “[t]oday, the emotional bond between author 
and work has been loosened”.
150
 No doubt, moral rights – that are the manifestations of the 
Romantic concept of authorship – are dead in some sense in the 21
st
 century. Still, they work as “an 
indicator of [the work’s] subject, reliability, and quality”.
151
 Similarly, Michel Foucault believed 
that “the author’s name is not simply an element in a discourse (…); it performs a certain role with 




By their nature, moral rights are bound to the human originators of the protectable expressions, and 
as such, they are inherent obstacles to any argument in favour of AI-copyright. We shall put aside 
this fact for a second, and try to answer the following question: can AI exercise the rights treated to 
be moral (or personal)? More precisely: can an algorithm have a name that is connected to its 
output? Can an AI decide the time of first publication? Can it decide on the withdrawal of the 
content; and can it “believe” that its output is complete in its form, and no detrimental changes or 
modifications shall be made to the expression? The answer might be clearly affirmative. Indeed, as 
humbly indicated above, moral rights represent the “trademarks” of the creators of contents, and in 
an overly trade oriented IP world, algorithms might be able to exercise such rights with great 
effectiveness. 
 
It is, however, a totally different question, whether algorithms can have any interests in those moral 
rights? Similarly to Daniel Gervais’ comment on the lack of interests for rewards and incentives by 
the AI,
153
 it is truly doubtful that machines need any enforceable rights to protect these moral or – 
as they are more frequently called in the European droit d’auteur and Urheberrecht – personal 
interests. And this is undeniable because AI simply does not fit into the existing concept of moral 
rights, as algorithms have no “personality”. 
 
VI. Options of protection – and the reasons of their dysfunctionality 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed five doctrinal elements of copyright law that are unfit to 
embrace emergent works at the moment. Unsurprisingly, this view of mine is far from accepted 
either in academia or in practice. Indeed, the summary report of AIPPI’s 2019 annual world 
congress on “Copyright in artificially generated works” analysed the response of over 30 national 
groups to AIPPI’s questionnaire. The report evidenced that significantly diverging views exist on 
the protectability of AI-generated outputs.
154
 It is worth the time to take a quick look at the 
available options regarding protectability. 
 
The default (and, in my opinion, the correct
155
) answer to the challenges of emergent works is 
public domain. While some might argue that a public domain solution would lead to lost 
incentives, we shall agree with Victor Palace, who noted that “the artificial intelligence industry is 
likely to continue flourishing regardless of copyrights – as it has until now – because of the 
incentives inherent to the artificial intelligence industry”.
156
 Others confirm that preserving the 
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unprotected nature of AI-generated outputs prioritize the community’s interests over available 
knowledge, which could ultimately enhance cultural development,
157
 maybe also by fostering 
cooperation between AI and humans.
158
 An alternative approach to the public domain concept 
calls machine-enabled outputs “authorless”. Under this concept, if the designer of the machine 
cannot claim sole authorship over the output/work; does not control the machine’s executional 
process; and the designer and the user of the machine do not collaborate in real time (to create the 




The “least intrusive” IP-oriented solution is the Japanese legislative proposal to introduce a 
“non-human-created IP” regime to cover AI-generated outputs, according to which “[r]ather than 
extending the copyright system, the policy body will look into a framework that handles works 
created by AI in a manner similar to trademarks, protecting them from unauthorized use through 
legislation prohibiting unfair competition”, and “the plan is to grant protection only to properties 
that achieve a certain degree of popularity or otherwise hold market value, in light of AI-based 




The idea of a brand new “disseminators’ right” – similarly to the one introduced by the EU 
Copyright Term Directive related to the publisher’s right in the publication of previously 
unpublished works – also appeared in the scientific literature.
161
 Others discussed the application 
of the existing concepts of (the European Union’s) database makers’ sui generis regime
162
 or of the 
neighbouring rights to emergent works.
163
 Others expressly favoured the introduction of a brand 




A lot of authors paid close attention
165
 to the UK’s – as well as New Zealand’s, Ireland’s, Hong 
Kong’s, South Africa’s and India’s similar – fiction to grant protection to “humans behind the 
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Many scholars discussed whether the work-made-for-hire doctrine could be tailored to effectively 
serve the interests of AI-employers;
167
 and so “the human behind the machine” can be rewarded 
for all past and future outputs of any machine. Others discussed – and immediately declared 
“undesirable or even impossible” – the reduction of the copyright term of protection.
168
 Some 
solicited for a combined acknowledgement of authorship and ownership interests over emergent 
works and a compulsory licensing of these outputs under Creative Commons licenses.
169
 Finally, a 
lot of emphasis has been put on the discussion of authorship and ownership interests (without any 
further restrictions) on programmers’, software owners’ and/or users’ side;
170
 or even joint 




Some of these proposals simply lack merit or run against the mere logic of copyright (and civil) 
law; e.g. those related to the reduction of copyright term or the mandatory combination of 
authorship and Creative Commons licensing. Other ideas are based on the possibility of stretching 
existing concepts to cover the AI-industry. As database makers’ sui generis protection or 
neighbouring rights regimes are based on significantly different policy purposes, and the exact 
norms offer insufficient flexibility to cover emergent works either,
172
 these proposals cannot 
generally be endorsed. 
 
Similarly, irrespective of its fanciness, the tailored work-made-for-hire (or, more properly, 
“contents-generated-for-hire”) doctrine lacks any doctrinal/philosophical basis,
173
 and it fails to 
meet all fundamental requirements of the (US) copyright law. First, such doctrine would 
over-reward the possible rights holders by protecting the unlimited outputs produced by the 
algorithm.
174
 Second, the prerequisites of “work”, “author” or “employee” (the last two would 
require a “human worker”) are fully missing in an AI-environment.
175
 Third, even under the 
work-made-for-hire concept the original work (the rights upon which are transferred to 
employees/commissioners) is (and must be) created by humans. The work-made-for-hire concept 
simply cannot be separated from the originalist premise of human authorship. Finally, any 
non-anthropocentric work-made-for-hire doctrine would clearly run against the spirit and the 




At least on its surface, the most promising option, the concept of “computer generated works”, fails 
to meet the high expectations either. First, while it leaves enough space for manoeuvre, it fails to 
cover the widest range of AI-generated outputs.
177
 Second, this norm has triggered only a single 
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decision in a three decades long timespan in its birthplace, the UK,
178
 which perfectly mirrors its 
limited success in real life. Third, recalling Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman’s opinion, “these 
changes were useful insofar as they clarified that creations generated by a computer could be 





New sui generis regimes might look practical in regulating an “emerging field” of IP, however, 
they are not without faults either. On the one hand, due to their tailor-made nature, there might be a 
significant disagreement over the acceptance of the exact norms on a multilateral level. On the 
other hand, the database makers’ sui generis rights have also triggered serious criticism. E.g. Julia 
Johnson correctly noted that „[i]n 2002, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
published a study identifying five concerns with the sui generis approach to database protection: 
that it could remove information from the public domain; create perpetual monopolies; harm the 
free flow of information; stifle the development of software and information systems; and hamper 
access to intellectual property in the developing world”.
180 We shall be ready to address such 




Michel Foucault, in his discussion on what the concept of author might mean, quoted (and 
criticized) Samuel Beckett’s famous question: “what does it matter who is speaking”?
181
 Foucault 
himself argued that “it does not seem necessary that the author function remain constant in form, 
complexity, and even in existence. I think that, as our society changes, at the very moment when it 
is in the process of changing, the author function will disappear”.
182
 AI-positivists usually echo 
this opinion and believe that “[i]f the copyright regime did not apply, such works could arguably 
cause market failures in the absence of other (legal) mechanisms which ensure substantively 
similar protection with appropriate public interest safeguards”.
183
 Or, as Toby Bond and Sarah 
Blair questioned it, “[s]hould copyright only reward acts of truly human cognition or does it play a 
more utilitarian role in society, encouraging the production and distribution of new works 




With due respect, this paper respectfully disagrees with the opinions noted above. I highlighted 
those fundamental arguments that support an AI-pessimistic view, or, being more terminologically 
pessimistic, the reasons why the current copyright regime (without being unnecessarily hacked) 
cannot cover emergent works. Some visionary opinions might be quoted to support this position. 
Sam Ricketson noted three decades ago that “[p]eople, rather than machines, have always been the 
object of the [Berne] Convention, and, from the point of view of principle, doctrine and 
practicality, this object should continue to be upheld”.
185
 Lev Grossman put it in his seminal article 
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on singularity, “[c]reating a work of art is one of those activities we reserve for humans and 
humans only. It's an act of self-expression; you're not supposed to be able to do it if you don't have 
a self”.
186
 Indeed, “allocating the copyright to the artificial intelligence would result in 
overwhelming and unnecessary legal uncertainty, and it would be contrary to the goal of the 
Patent and Copyright Clause”.
187
 This might be true in Europe as well, even though we have no 
equivalent to the IP Clause of the United States Constitution. Finally, and maybe most 
importantly, Daniel Gervais convincingly summarized the ultimate goal of copyright law: “both 
art in myriad forms and quality journalism have had and should continue to have a role in helping 





In sum, this paper takes the view that, on the one hand, copyright law is a fiction, a legal 
manifestation of a complex (socio-cultural and economic), fluid and constantly changing set of 
interests. Unless comprehensive and convincing social, cultural and economic (empirical) 
evidences exist (or come into existence) to the opposite, the lack of justifications, sound policy 
arguments and doctrinal clarity shall bar the introduction of any copyright protection for emergent 
works.
189
 A rare example for empirical evidences is a paper by Kalin Hristov. His questionnaire – 
analysing the response of fifty-seven AI scientists, tech policy experts and copyright scholars – 
also concluded that  
 
“half of participants believe that the US copyright system is not adequately prepared for a future influx of AI-produced 
works. Respondents, however, fail to reach a resounding consensus on what changes should be implemented by the US 
Copyright Office. The divided nature of expert opinion and the limited data available to researchers studying 




As long as we are uncertain that the society in general, and human progress (especially culture) in 
specific would benefit from an AI-copyright regime, rather than only a few stakeholders involved 
in AI-research, we favour not to regulate at all. We shall agree with Axel Walz, who noted that 
„[r]egulation, though, is not the only possible, and in many cases may not even be the best 
approach to retain control over AI”.
191
 Likewise, Daniel Schönberger took the view that the 
“claims for legislative actions are not convincing”.
192
 I believe that the wisest decision would be to 
follow a wait-and-see approach, and check whether licensing of AI-generated outputs (not as a 
work, but as information or data) necessitates any intervention – either pro or contra the interests of 
“creators” or AI-investors. 
 
Admittedly, this summary opinion fails to answer an important question. Namely, will the 
copyright protection of AI-generated outputs ever become a reality? We shall admit that it would 





 for, as well as the appropriate form of the protection and the 
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194
 Manuel Desantes Real took the view that AI can be the flagship of the Fourth industrial revolution, where the 
detailed and balanced set of rules (maybe one of the many options introduced above or a mixture of 
them) does not seem to be impossible at all. At the moment, however, the protectability of 
emergent works is a less acute copyright question than whether the use of algorithms in data 
analysis runs against existing copyrights (including database makers’ sui generis protection), or 
whether AI (creators, investors or users) can rely on any limitation or exception.
195
 Indeed, it looks 
a balance compromise to apply limitations or exceptions for the benefit of AI in order to support 
effective machine learning activities, rather than envisaging any copyright protection for the 
AI-generated outputs. Similarly, it is still an open question whether automated (algorithmic) 
enforcement of copyright is desirable or acceptable,
196





We shall agree with James Grimmelmann that “[c]opyright law doesn’t recognize computer 
programs as authors, and it shouldn’t. Some day it might make sense to, but if that day ever comes, 
copyright will be the least of our concerns”.
198
 The inferiority – or less timely nature – of 
protection of emergent works is also visible from many policy reports of national and 
intergovernmental AI-policies that tend to put greater emphasis on the intertwined notions of 
trust
199
 and transparency in,
200
 as well as accountability of
201
 AI. E.g. copyright law played no 
significant role in the European Union’s policy documents since the Civil Law Rules of Robotics 
was finally abandoned. Both the European Strategy for AI of 2018,
202
 and, most recently, the 
White Paper 2020 have sidestepped this issue.
203
 Indeed, the White Paper 2020 laid down the 
foundations of a human-centric and ethical, trustworthy regime of AI regulations that provide for 
clear norms on the responsibility for as well as the guarantees of the safety of AI research and 
outputs. The White Paper declared a key prerequisite of any such system of rules that outputs are 
overseen by humans, and European values and other existing rules are respected. The U.S. 
Government’s AI Initiative expressed its intent to secure the economic leadership of the United 
States in the field of AI, on the one hand, and listed key policies and practices e.g. investing in AI 
research and development; unleashing AI resources; removing barriers to AI innovation; training 
an AI-ready workforce; promoting an international environment supportive of American AI 
innovation; and embracing trustworthy AI for government services and missions.
204
 Neither the 
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Nevertheless, legislative proposals might be on the horizon soon. The WIPO has launched a public 
consultation on AI and IP. As a part of that, WIPO has prepared a draft and a revised Issues Paper 
on IP Policy and AI, and has also completed two rounds of “conversations”,
206
 while planning the 
third round of those conversations for November 2020.
207
 Indeed, it might be the wisest option, if 
WIPO takes the lead in solving the necessarily global tensions surrounding the IP/copyright 
protection of AI-generated outputs.  
 
The European Parliament, unlike the European Commission, seems to be more receptive to the idea 
of AI-copyright as well. On the one hand, the “Draft Report on intellectual property rights for the 
development of artificial intelligence technologies”, published on April 24, 2020, recommended to 
side-line the hurdles posed by originality (and the personal touch) by relying on “the creative result 
rather than the creative process”.
208
 On the other hand, the report also intended to focus on the 
“human behind the machine”, and proposed that  
 
“an assessment should be undertaken of the advisability of granting copyright to such a ‘creative work’ to the natural 
person who prepares and publishes it lawfully, provided that the designer(s) of the underlying technology has/have not 
opposed such use. This reasoning would be in line with the European system of protection of ‘works data’; such data 
may be exploited as part of the data used to train AI technologies which can then generate secondary creations, 





In sum, the European Parliament’s (current) position opens the door for some kind of 
AI-positivistic legislation.
210
 Whether such system would truly favour human culture and the 
copyright ecosystem in general, is still unclear. We shall therefore keep a watchful eye on the 
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